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WHEN FOR BETTER IS FOR WORSE:
IMMIGRATION LAW’S GENDERED IMPACT
ON FOREIGN POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE
SARAH L. EICHENBERGER†
ABSTRACT
The United States has banned polygamous immigrants since the
late nineteenth century. Enacted amid isolationist fears that an influx
of polygamists would cause moral deterioration, the polygamy bar
remains a resolute, if often overlooked, feature of modern
immigration law. The current immigration scheme continues this
tradition, rendering immigrants who intend to practice polygamy in
the United States categorically ineligible for legal-permanent-resident
status. As a result, the immigration bar allows polygamous men to
immigrate with a wife of their choosing and the children from each of
their marriages. Their other wives, however, are deemed inadmissible
to the United States.
This Note explores the immigration bar’s disproportionate effect
on the foreign wives of polygamous immigrants. In addition to
precluding the other wives of polygamous immigrants from legalpermanent-resident status, the current immigration bar also renders
such women ineligible for humanitarian ingress. After offering a
comparative analysis of how Canada and the United Kingdom
reconcile their respective policies against polygamy with the
burgeoning question of women’s rights, this Note proposes that
Congress likewise treat foreign women in polygamous unions with a
degree of equity.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2008, authorities raided the Mormon Fundamentalist
Yearning for Zion Ranch. International news agencies captured
footage of the ranch’s women and children who, wearing prairie-style
dresses and shell-shocked expressions, appeared hauntingly out of
1
place. Yet when a fire at a Bronx row house in March 2007 exposed
Malian-born Moussa Magassa’s polygamous family, the story barely
2
registered in the national consciousness. Instead, it was greeted with
virtual silence. Perhaps Americans ignored Magassa’s story because it
3
lacked the salacious innuendo: the alleged incest, child brides, and
4
sexual abuse. Or perhaps it went unnoticed because polygamous
immigrants, unlike their American counterparts, are better left out of
sight and out of mind.
Under current immigration law, immigrants who intend to
practice polygamy in the United States are categorically inadmissible.
Nevertheless, immigrants like Magassa are hardly unique. Indeed, as
a 2007 article in The New York Times reported, the “clandestine
5
practice . . . probably involves thousands of New Yorkers” because,
for the immigrants who have been bequeathed polygamy as a cultural
inheritance, plural marriage does not stop at the United States’ entry
ports. Instead, as one Gambian woman remarked, “[W]hether
[immigrant women] like it or not, [their husbands] will marry”
6
additional wives. The wives of polygamous immigrants have no
means of escaping their marriages, she observed, because “[i]f you
1. Andrew Gumbel, Zion Raid: The Ranch Has Not Yet Revealed All Its Secrets . . .,
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 13, 2008, at A16.
2. The New York Times was the only national newspaper to carry Magassa’s story. See
Nina Bernstein, Polygamy, Practiced in Secrecy, Follows Africans to New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2007, at A1.
3. Warren Jeffs, the former leader of the Yearning for Zion Ranch, was charged as an
accomplice to “four counts of incest and sexual conduct with a minor stemming from two
arranged marriages.” Texan Sect Girls ‘In Abuse Cycle,’ BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/7339392.stm (last updated Apr. 9, 2008). In August 2011, Jeffs was convicted of child
sexual assault. Polygamist Leader Convicted of Child Sex Abuse, NPR (Aug. 4, 2011), http://
www.npr.org/2011/08/04/139004476/polygamist-leader-convicted-of-child-sex-abuse (“A Texas
jury has convicted polygamist leader Warren Jeffs of child sexual assault charges in a case
stemming from two young followers he took as brides in what his church calls ‘spiritual
marriages.’”).
4. See Sara Corbett, Children of God, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2008, at 36, 36
(describing one of the minors removed from the Yearning for Zion Ranch as “a member of an
out-of-touch religious sect” and “a possible child bride, or a sexual-abuse victim”).
5. Bernstein, supra note 2.
6. Id.
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protest, your husband will hit you, and if you call the police . . . the
7
whole community will scorn you.” State legal systems favor “[d]on’task-don’t-know policies” over intervention into immigrants’
polygamous marriages, relying on immigration laws to keep
8
practicing polygamists from entering the country in the first place.
This approach places immigrant women who circumvent the
immigration bar on uncertain ground, where their status is “murky at
9
10
best” and “invisible” at worst.
This Note explores the polygamy bar’s disproportionate effect on
11
foreign-born women in polygamous marriages. Polygamy is a deeply
ingrained practice within some of the world’s most prominent
12
religions. In the United States, however, polygamy did not become a
widespread phenomenon until the nineteenth century, when
Mormons adopted plural marriage as a tenet of their faith.
Threatened by what they perceived as a deviant religion, critics of the
Mormon Church seized on polygamy as a reason for marginalizing
the emergent sect. Although the antipolygamy campaign was initially
motivated by a desire to emancipate Mormon wives, the critics’
dialogue quickly morphed into a condemnation of Mormon women,
whose apparent complicity in plural marriage was thought to merit
punishment rather than sympathy. In response to the growing public
outrage, Congress enacted legislation that curtailed Mormon
women’s rights and, thus, tacitly endorsed the misogynistic rhetoric.
Because modern immigration law preserves the last vestiges of the
federal antipolygamy campaign, its gendered understanding of plural

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR
(May 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90857818.
11. Although polygamy technically encompasses both polyandry—one woman marrying
several men—and polygyny—one man marrying several women—this Note uses the term
“polygamy” to denote only polygyny because polyandry is extremely rare. Shayna M. Sigman,
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 161
(2006).
12. An estimated 5.8 percent of Hindu marriages are polygamous, and an estimated 5.7
percent of Muslim marriages are polygamous. SHAILLY SAHAI, SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND
STATUS OF HINDU WOMEN 45 (1996). Polygamy, however, is not limited to the Islamic and
Hindu faiths. In Cameroon, for example, where the native people practiced polygamy long
before their conversion to Christianity, Cameroonites “develop[ed] a theory in which
[polygamy] was part of ‘true’ Christianity.” Sigman, supra note 11, at 160 (quoting Catrien
Notermans, True Christianity Without Dialogue: Women and the Polygyny Debate in Cameroon,
97 ANTHROPOS 341, 346–47 (2002)).
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marriage perpetuates the very discrimination that polygamy itself is
13
accused of enabling.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I estimates the incidence of
polygamous marriage among recent U.S. immigrants. Part II traces
the gender-motivated history of antipolygamy legislation in the
United States. Part III examines how U.S. immigration laws
disadvantage foreign women in polygamous marriages. Part IV
analyzes the more equitable treatment of plural wives under the
immigration laws of Canada and the United Kingdom. Finally, Part V
argues that the United States should adopt the equitable model of its
peer nations by waiving the polygamy bar in humanitarian situations
and treating women in polygamous unions as putative spouses. This
Note concludes that existing U.S. immigration laws seek to end
polygamy among foreign immigrants the same way nineteenthcentury lawmakers sought to reform Mormonism: by divesting
women in polygamous marriages of their rights. If female
emancipation indeed remains the United States’ endgame, then
Congress should adopt a more nuanced polygamy bar.
I. THE INCIDENCE OF POLYGAMOUS IMMIGRATION
For two decades, Western democracies have grappled with the
14
problem of polygamous immigrants. In the midst of this burgeoning
international debate, the United States has remained conspicuously
15
silent because, officially, it does not admit practicing polygamists.
The unofficial story, however, is different. According to the
Department of Homeland Security 2010 Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics, some of the United States’ largest immigrant populations
16
come from countries in which polygamy is “lawful and widespread.”
13. See Sigman, supra note 11, at 163 (indicating that polygamy is often perceived as a
“gender biased monolith”).
14. For example, in the early 1990s, France enacted a law that forced polygamous
immigrants to “de-cohabitate.” Bissuel Bertrand, Divorce, or Else . . ., 44 WORLD PRESS REV. 4,
4 (2002). Several years after that development, the United Kingdom quietly extended welfare
benefits to the wives of polygamous immigrants. See Susan Martinuk, Polygamous Marriages
Drain Taxpayer Dollars, CALGARY HERALD (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.canada.com/
calgaryherald/news/theeditorialpage/story.html?id=4584f9bc-04ce-4608-b740-72b422deef14
(“[The British government] acted quietly and without public consultation in agreeing to pay
polygamists subsidies for additional housing and to grant additional tax benefits.”).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A)
(2006) (“Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice polygamy is
inadmissible.”).
16. Bernstein, supra note 2.
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In 2008, scholars estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000
17
immigrant families were practicing polygamy in the United States.
In 2010, the United States accepted 101,355 immigrants from
18
Africa alone, where an estimated 20 to 50 percent of marriages are
19
polygamous. The largest percentages of immigrants attaining
permanent-resident status in 2010 hailed from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and
20
Egypt. The incidence of polygamy varies among these nations, with
21
approximately 10 percent of Ethiopians engaging in polygamy,
22
compared to the estimated 71 percent of Bajju Nigerians and 25
23
percent of Egyptian men. A significant number of the legal
permanent residents admitted to the United States in 2010 also came
from the Middle East, where polygamy—although no longer the
24
dominant form of marriage—retains a significant presence.
Approximately 3 percent of the United States’ 2010 immigrant
25
population originated in Iraq and Iran, both of which allow men to
26
take multiple wives. Other immigrant populations in the United

17. Hagerty, supra note 10.
18. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 12–15 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf.
19. Nicholas Bala, Katherine Duvall-Antonacopoulos, Leslie MacRae & Joanne J. Paetsch,
An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY
IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN report 2, at 16
(2005), available at http://www.vancouversun.com/pdf/polygamy_021209.pdf.
20. In 2010, 14,266 legal permanent residents were admitted from Ethiopia, 13,376 legal
permanent residents were admitted from Nigeria, and 8,978 legal permanent residents were
admitted from Egypt. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 12–15 tbl.3.
21. See ETH. CENT. STATISTICAL AGENCY & ORC MACRO, ETHIOPIA DEMOGRAPHIC
AND HEALTH SURVEY 2005, at 81 (2006), available at http://204.12.126.218/dhs/pubs/pdf/FR179/
FR179[23June2011].pdf (estimating that 5.1 percent of Ethiopian marriages include two or more
co-wives).
22. Carol V. McKinney, Wives and Sisters: Bajju Marital Patterns, 31 ETHNOLOGY 75, 84
(1992).
23. Reem Leila, Polygamous Duplicity, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE (Feb. 26, 2004),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/679/li1.htm.
24. Sigman, supra note 11, at 159.
25. In 2010, the United States admitted 14,182 Iranian nationals and 19,855 Iraqi nationals
as legal permanent residents. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15
tbl.3.
26. In Iran, a man can have as many wives as “he desires or can afford.” Susan Tiefenben,
The Semiotics of Women’s Human Rights in Iran, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 63 (2007). Similarly, in
Iraq, the law allows a man to take a second wife, provided that he obtains permission from a
sharia judge. Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 51 (2006).
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27

States hail from Saudi Arabia, where an estimated 19 percent of
28
29
married women are in plural marriages, and from Jordan, where
approximately 28 percent of women in the nation’s South Ghor
30
region are in plural marriages. Thus, although polygamy sits in the
crosshairs of an international debate, the influx of immigrants from
polygamy-friendly countries into the United States suggests that its
31
presence in the United States is largely shrouded in denial.
II. THAT RELIC OF BARBARISM: MORMON POLYGAMY AND THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE
America’s struggle with polygamy largely began in the midnineteenth century, when polygamy was adopted as a feature of the
Mormon faith. Antipolygamists, who viewed the practice as a form of
sexual slavery, enlisted lawmakers in their fight for female
emancipation. Over time, however, public sentiment shifted against
Mormon women as it became clear that they were willing participants
in plural marriage. In response, legislators sought to deprive Mormon
women of their political rights as retribution for their complicity.
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, polygamy had morphed
into both a rationale for alienation and a basis for exclusionary
immigration policies.
A. Polygamy in Antebellum America: Mormonism and Abolitionist
Rhetoric
America’s polygamy debate began with the Mormon Church’s
32
endorsement of the practice. Although polygamy was not an original
tenet of Mormonism, it was enshrined as a central teaching of the
faith in 1843, when church leader Joseph Smith urged his followers to

27. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15 tbl.3 (noting that
1263 Saudi Arabians were admitted as legal permanent residents in 2010).
28. TAWFIK A. KHOJA & SAMIR A. FARID, SAUDI ARABIA FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY 97
(2000).
29. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 12–15 tbl.3 (noting that
3868 Jordanians were admitted as legal permanent residents in 2010).
30. Shuji Sueyosi & Ryutar Ohtsuka, Effects of Polygyny and Consanguinity on High
Fertility in the Rural Arab Population in South Jordan, 35 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 513, 521 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 2 (“[T]he picture that emerges . . . is of a clandestine
practice that probably involves thousands of New Yorkers.”).
32. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 1 (2002).
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marry multiple women. Smith’s exhortation incited public outrage.
Although writers of popular literature were among the first to decry
35
plural marriage, the most resounding condemnation came from
politicians, who compared polygamy to the reviled practice of
36
slavery.
The rhetorical comparison of polygamous marriage to slavery
37
was not a novel concept in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Rather, because “structurally, conceptually, and legally the
[nineteenth-century] relations of husband to wife, and master to
38
slave, were parallel,” slavery and polygamy were frequently
regarded as analogous institutions. Early abolitionists vituperated
against American slavery as an affront to the traditional marital
institution because it created “a system in which marriage had no
sanctity, and fathers sold, prostituted, and committed incest
39
with . . . the daughters of their slave mistresses.” Antislavery
politicians took the analogy one step further, likening Southerners’
“harem-like privileges over their female slaves” to the Mormon
40
practice of polygamy. Abolitionist Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar,
however, was the first critic to analogize polygamy and slavery
41
directly, excoriating the practices as the “twin relics of barbarism.”
Driven by fears that the “unrestrained sexuality” common to both
42
practices would beget “anti-Republican tendencies,” the 1856

33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 23.
35. Id. at 29. Popular literature focused on the plight of the Mormon women, who “met
with one of two fates: the virtuous suffered, even died, the weak descended into viciousness and
vulgarity.” Id. at 42.
36. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in U.S.
Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 390 (2009).
37. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 62 (2000).
38. Id. In Daniel Defoe’s 1740 novel Roxana, the heroine opines: “[T]he very Nature of the
Marriage Contract was . . . nothing but giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and every-thing to
the Man, and the Woman was indeed a meer Woman ever after, that is to say, a Slave.” DANIEL
DEFOE, ROXANA 169 (Melissa Mowry ed., Broadview Press 2009) (1740).
39. COTT, supra note 40, at 58–59.
40. Id. at 73.
41. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 130 (1995) (quoting Hoar) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
42. Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the
Congressional Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 445 (2009).
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Republican platform resolved “to prohibit in the Territories those
43
twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.”
The antipolygamy campaign continued with the Morrill Anti44
45
Bigamy Act of 1862, which criminalized polygamy. Upon its
introduction to the Senate, the act sparked a heated debate; in a
speech entitled “The Barbarism of Slavery,” Senator Charles Sumner
drew a comparison between polygamy, by which “one man may have
many wives, all bound to him by the marriage tie,” and slavery, by
which “a whole race is delivered over to prostitution and
46
concubinage.” It was time, Senator Sumner concluded, to halt the
47
“abrogation of marriage.” Despite subsequent challenges to the act’s
validity, the Supreme Court upheld the Morill Anti-Bigamy Act in
48
Reynolds v. United States, stating that it is well “within the legitimate
scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its
49
dominion.” Despite its harsh rhetoric, however, the Morill Anti50
Bigamy Act failed to end the practice of polygamy. With the
polygamous “twin” still conspicuously at large, Congress redoubled
its efforts to emancipate Mormon women through a series of
legislative measures.
B. Antipolygamy Legislation During Reconstruction
In the wake of the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act’s failure to curtail
polygamy, a group of radical politicians resurrected the polygamy
51
debate in the hopes of expunging the “stain of human slavery.” The
campaign, which began in 1867, rekindled the feminist rhetoric

43. REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1856 (1856),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619. But see Phipps, supra
note 42, at 447 (“[T]he 1856 Republican national platform did not reflect a defined antipolygamy agenda.”).
44. Morill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1910).
45. Id. § 1, 12 stat. at 501.
46. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 259192 (1860) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
47. Id. at 2591 (emphasis omitted). Representative John Alexander McClernand
expounded similar sentiments, calling polygamy “a scarlet whore” that “is often an adjunct to
political despotism.” Id. at 1514 (statement of Rep. McClernand).
48. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
49. Id. at 166.
50. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3574 (1870) (statement of Sen. Aaron Cragin)
(“In 1862 Congress passed a law prohibiting polygamy in the Territories, and making it a crime;
but the law is a dead letter, because the courts of Utah have no power to enforce it.”).
51. Id. at 2144 (statement of Rep. Elijah Ward).
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espoused by polygamy’s early opponents. Congressman Elijah Ward
denounced polygamy as a practice that undermined a woman’s “great
52
ambition” by rendering her “a debauched and dishonored thing.”
Senator Aaron Cragin concurred, condemning the “devilish art of
cunning men” who forced “ignorant and deluded women” into
53
polygamy. These positions culminated in the proposal of the Cullom
54
Bill of 1870 (Cullom Bill), which perpetuated the comparison of
polygamy and slavery. The Cullom Bill sought to marginalize
practicing polygamists by barring “any person living in or practicing
bigamy, polygamy, or concubinage” from holding “any office of trust
or profit” in territorial Utah, and further, by preventing such
55
individuals from “vot[ing] at any election.” In addition, the bill
required all elected government officials in the Utah Territory to take
the following oath: “I am not living in or practicing bigamy,
polygamy, or concubinage, and I will not hereafter live in or practice
56
the same.” This oath, which the Cullom Bill’s proponents
“unabashedly linked” to the Civil War’s ironclad oath of union
loyalty, “was a powerful signifier of the political and social exclusion
57
of Confederate sympathizers from the national community.” For the
bill’s advocates, the oath requirement “directed similar symbolic
58
exclusion at polygamous husbands.”
The Cullom Bill also used criminal law to attack practicing
polygamists. The bill continued to prohibit polygamy and indeed
reduced the evidentiary proof necessary to sustain a conviction. The
proposed legislation decreed that “it shall not be necessary to prove
either the first or subsequent marriages, by the registration or
certificate thereof, . . . but the same may be proved by . . . proof of
cohabitation [or the husband’s] acts recognizing, acknowledging,
59
introducing, treating, or deporting himself toward them as [wives].”
For relationships that could not be successfully prosecuted under this
evidentiary rubric, the bill created a new crime of “concubinage,”

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 2143 (statement of Rep. Ward).
Id. at 3574 (statement of Sen. Cragin).
Cullom Bill, H.R. 1089, 41st Cong. (1870).
Id. § 19.
Id.
Phipps, supra note 42, at 45758.
Id. at 459.
Cullom Bill § 12.
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which criminalized “cohabit[ation] with one woman or more, other
60
than [a man’s] lawful wife.”
Despite its harsh stance against polygamous husbands, the bill
took a more conciliatory approach toward plural wives. Motivated by
fears that “suddenly break[ing] down the system of polygamy” would
“leave the women and children of the [Utah] Territory helpless and
61
dependent, and, perhaps, in a starving condition,” the drafters of the
bill created a provision that obligated men who were convicted of
“bigamy, polygamy, or of any adulterous or incestuous marriage” to
provide financial support for their dependent wives, concubines, and
62
children. To facilitate this support, the bill enabled courts to “order
the sale of so much of the [man]’s personal property . . . as shall be
needed for the support and maintenance of the wife, concubines, and
children . . . until such time when such persons can procure labor or
63
means to support themselves.” If a property sale was inadequate, the
bill authorized government officials to furnish “temporary relief” to
women “reduced to destitution by the enforcement of the laws
64
against polygamy.” The bill, however, ultimately failed to clear the
65
Senate.
66
Like the Cullom Bill, an early version of the Poland Act of 1874
(Poland Act) sought to eliminate polygamy without undermining
women’s rights. In an effort to facilitate federal polygamy
prosecutions, the Poland Act stripped Utah county courts of all
criminal and civil jurisdiction other than limited divorce, estate,
67
guardianship, and related matters. This provision was designed to
circumvent the Utah county probate courts, which were staffed with
68
Mormon ecclesiastical leaders sympathetic to plural marriage. In the
aftermath of the Act’s passage, “federal prosecutors began arresting
69
Mormon leaders en masse,” in an effort to curtail polygamy. To

60. Id. § 13.
61. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1372 (1870) (statement of Rep. Shelby M. Cullom).
62. Cullom Bill § 30.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 31.
65. The bill failed in part because moderate Republicans refuted the analogy of polygamy
to slavery. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2149 (1870) (statement of Rep. Austin Blair)
(“[W]e cannot forget the fact that [plural wives] went there voluntarily.”).
66. Poland Act, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874).
67. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 253–54.
68. Sigman, supra note 11, at 121.
69. Id. at 122.
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mitigate the harsh consequences faced by women whose husbands
would be arrested under the Act, an early incarnation of the Poland
Act contained a provision—similar to one found in the Cullom Bill—
that would have enabled courts to give plural wives “such [a]
reasonable sum for alimony . . . as the circumstances of the case will
70
justify.” Advocating in favor of this provision, Senator George
Edmunds argued that the law should afford the benefit of divorce to
the victim of any relationship that was neither “sporadic” nor
71
“criminal in the Mormon sense.” Senator Edmunds’s approach,
however, was met with outrage from opponents who saw Mormon
wives as exemplars of a morally bankrupt system. Senator Oliver
Morton, for example, found it unthinkable that a man’s several wives
should “acquire rights to [their husbands’] property as against his
children and as against his relatives, where they are both in fault and
72
both in crime.” Senator Eugene Casserly concurred, arguing that
because polygamous marriages were illegal, a man’s subsequent wives
should not be placed “on precisely the same footing with the lawful
73
wife.” Ultimately, Congress voted against the Poland Act’s femaleprotective provisions, relying instead on jurisdiction stripping to allow
74
federal authorities to nullify plural marriages.
Unlike the Cullom Bill and the Poland Act, both of which
considered giving subsequent wives putative rights to their voided
75
marriages, the Edmunds Act of 1882 (Edmunds Act) refused to
grant women any rights to their illicit unions. In addition to banning
cohabitation, the Act disenfranchised both practicing polygamists and
76
their wives. The Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds Act in
77
Murphy v. Ramsay, praising the legislature’s choice of monogamy as
78
the “best guaranty” of morality. After the Edmunds Act’s passage,
79
an estimated 1300 Mormon men were prosecuted for polygamy. Yet
70. Poland Act, H.R. 3089, 43d Cong. § 3 (1874).
71. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1789 (1873) (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
72. Id. (statement of Sen. Morton).
73. Id. at 1800 (statement of Sen. Casserly); see also id. at 1795 (providing that polygamous
marriages are “unlawful, simply null and void”).
74. See Sigman, supra note 11, at 121 n.134 (noting that “stripping courts of jurisdiction has
been recognized as a tactic to achieve desired political results,” which, in this case, was the end
of polygamous unions).
75. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (repealed 1983).
76. Id. § 8, 22 Stat. at 31–32.
77. Murphy v. Ramsay, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
78. Id. at 45.
79. Sigman, supra note 11, at 128.

EICHENBERGER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1078

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2012 4:30 PM

[Vol. 61:1067

as the alleged wives of indicted polygamists regularly perjured
themselves to exonerate their husbands, Americans began to question
whether Mormon women were the pawns or the perpetrators of
80
plural marriage. Although some activists continued to argue that
Mormon women were a marginalized class, others found it
81
increasingly difficult to classify Mormon women as hapless victims.
Former advocates of emancipation instead began to recast Mormon
82
women as the “lynchpin[s]” of their own enslavement.
In an attempt to inure a harsher stance against polygamists,
83
Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887 (Edmunds84
Tucker Act), which criminalized male adultery and repealed the
85
incorporation of the Mormon Church. The law’s primary aim,
however, was to bolster the foundering marital institution in the Utah
86
territory by taking aim at Mormon women. In addition to
87
criminalizing “fornication” by unmarried women, the act annulled
88
illegitimate children’s succession rights and disenfranchised female
89
Many antipolygamists had come to regard the
voters.
enfranchisement of Mormon women fifteen years earlier as a catalyst
of female subversion, because the right to vote had done little to
90
emancipate Mormon women. This perception was validated by a
Mormon bishop’s remark that “[t]he women of Utah vote, and they
91
never desert the colors of the church.” This perception of their
loyalty earned Mormon women the unhappy reputation as the
92
“catspaw of the [Mormon] priesthood.” Thus, the purpose of the
80. GORDON, supra note 32, at 16263.
81. Id. at 164. In her lecture entitled “The Mormon Monster,” contemporary commentator
Kate Field echoed the shock among antipolygamists at the fact that “a female Mormon lobby
ask[ed] Congress to give to Utah the liberty of self-degradation!” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted).
82. Id.
83. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (repealed 1978).
84. Id. § 3, 24 Stat. at 635–36.
85. Id. § 17, 24 Stat. at 638.
86. GORDON, supra note 32, at 167.
87. Edmunds-Tucker Act § 5, 24 Stat. at 636.
88. Id. § 11, 24 Stat. at 637.
89. Id. § 20, 24 Stat. at 639.
90. GORDON, supra note 32, at 168.
91. Id. Rather than using the newly enacted female vote to eliminate polygamy, Mormon
women “overwhelmingly supported the election of Mormon candidates to public offices.” Omri
Elisha, Sustaining Charisma: Mormon Sectarian Culture and the Struggle for Plural Marriage,
18521890, 6 NOVA RELIGIO 45, 54 (2002).
92. GORDON, supra note 32, at 16870.
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Edmunds-Tucker Act’s disenfranchisement provision was to “relieve
the Mormon women of Utah from the slavehood” that the right to
93
vote had failed to dispel. In recognizing that Mormon women were
not passive victims of plural marriage, the Edmunds-Tucker Act
signaled a turning point in the antipolygamy campaign. Mormon
women, once the subjects of pity, had morphed into objects of public
derision, their presence a chimera amid the nascent politics of
emancipation.
Polygamy’s legacy persisted long after Utah officially banned the
94
practice as a condition of its admission to the United States in 1896.
During the course of the federal debate, polygamy had become
synonymous with two of America’s most reviled practices: slavery and
deviant sexuality. Yet the pall of moral opprobrium fell primarily on
the women who capitulated to plural marriage, rather than on the
men who indulged in the practice. As a result, polygamy assumed an
unmistakably gendered connotation.
C. Polygamy as a Mechanism for Exclusionist Policies
Polygamy did not become a prominent facet of American
immigration policy until the late nineteenth century, when an influx
of Chinese laborers and their concubine wives prompted a public
backlash. The wave of ensuing legislation barring Chinese immigrants
borrowed the gendered concept of enslavement from the debate over
Mormon polygamy. This exclusionary legislation branded polygamy
as a new type of barbarism.
Chinese immigration to the United States began in earnest in the
95
1840s in response to an increased demand for cheap labor. Although
anti-Chinese sentiment was not new, it reached a fever pitch in the
1870s, when an economic downturn quickly gave rise to rhetoric
decrying the Chinese “coolie” laborers who “worked too
96
hard . . . saved too much, and spent too little.” Critics rallied against
the influx of “Asiatic coolies” who forced American laborers “into
93. Id. at 171. Antipolygamists believed that “[w]omen who consented to a legitimate
marriage . . . had made their choice and should thereafter defer to the political voice of their
husbands, who would ‘represent’ the interest of the household at the polls.” Id.
94. See UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1 (“[P]olygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.”).
95. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 641, 649 (2005).
96. CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10 (1995).
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unjust and ruinous competition, by placing the white workingman
entirely at the mercy of the coolie employer, and building up a system
97
of slavery.” A substantial portion of the anti-Chinese sentiment was
channeled into criticism of the Chinese marital structure, which
condoned a hierarchy of primary wives, secondary wives, concubines,
and prostitutes. Because most Chinese immigrants’ primary wives
remained in China, the vast majority of Chinese women who entered
the United States were situated further down in the marital
98
hierarchy. Consequently, Chinese marital customs became more
than a mere “signifier of [Chinese immigrants’] essential
99
foreignness.” Rather, as Americans observed the fluid delineation
100
between Chinese wives and prostitutes, Chinese marital customs
became the focal point of anti-Chinese sentiment.
Accordingly, it did not take long for legislators to seize on
polygamy as a ground for Chinese exclusion. Arguing that
intermarriage between native-born Americans and Chinese women
“of a lower moral tone” would “cause a general moral
101
deterioration,” federal legislators responded to Chinese polygamy
in much the same way as they had to Mormon polygamy: by
102
construing Chinese marriage as a form of institutionalized slavery.
Whereas American monogamy was premised on mutual consent, the
Chinese marital system was characterized by a “sordid monetary
103
exchange and . . . coercion on the part of the woman involved.”
According to legislators, Chinese marital traditions embodied a
97. Abrams, supra note 95, at 652 (quoting Anti-Chinese Convention, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
19, 1870, at 3).
98. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 41 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page).
99. Phipps, supra note 42, at 47; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)
(“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and,
until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people.”).
100. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 656 (“[T]he distinction between ‘wife’ and ‘prostitute’
was not static: Many women brought to the United States as prostitutes later escaped
prostitution by becoming the wives of Chinese laborers.”).
101. COTT, supra note 37, at 135.
102. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 653 (“Americans responded to [Chinese marital customs
with] a conviction that the Chinese treated all women . . . as slaves.”).
103. COTT, supra note 37, at 136; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1056 (1866)
(statement of Rep. William Higby) (warning that because Chinese men “buy and sell their
women like cattle, and the trade is mostly for the purpose of prostitution[,] . . . [y]ou cannot
make citizens of them”); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 219 (1998)
(“Prostitution appeared to embody all the forces threatening the legitimacy of contract as a
model of freedom.”).
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104

“benumbing despotism” at odds with the country’s newly minted
105
politics of freedom. If left unchecked, critics contended, polygamy
106
would “destroy [the white man’s] very being.” Such rhetoric created
107
an “ominous variation” on the abolitionist theme. And, thus, the
United States, by characterizing Chinese marital traditions as slavery
and Chinese women as the instruments of enslavement, “justified
denying [Chinese immigrants] the right to enter or remain in the
108
United States.”
109
The Page Law of 1875 (Page Law), which took aim at the
prostitutes who critics blamed for turning America into a “cess-pool”
110
of depravity, was the first legislative measure targeting Chinese
111
immigrant women. The Page Law barred any “subject of China,
Japan or any Oriental country” who had “entered into a contract or
agreement for a term of service . . . for lewd and immoral purposes”
112
from immigrating to the United States. Legislators openly praised
the measure for “send[ing] the brazen harlot . . . back to her native
113
country,” and proponents hailed the law as the only way to prevent
the “deadly blight” of Chinese immigration from corrupting
114
American values.
In practice, however, because immigration
officials often failed to differentiate between prostitutes and wives
within the Chinese marital hierarchy, the Page Law resulted in the
115
exclusion of many legitimate Chinese wives from the United States.
Despite the Page Law’s passage and subsequent enforcement,
legislators continued to lament the lack of “respectable” Chinese
104. S. REP. NO. 44-689, at vi (1876).
105. See 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page) (“[A] more
insidious danger must eventuate by the great increase of this servile [Chinese laborer]
population”); COTT, supra note 37, at 137 (“Prostitutes echoed the evil pinned on Chinese
contract [‘coolie’] laborers: their presence in the United States signified coercion, more akin to
the slavery tabooed a decade earlier than to the voluntary choice of welcomed migrants.”).
106. See Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5
PUTNAM’S MONTHLY 225, 234 (1855) (“Strike [monogamy] out, and you destroy [the civilized
white man’s] very being . . . .”).
107. Phipps, supra note 42, at 473.
108. Id.
109. Page Law, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974).
110. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page).
111. See Abrams, supra note 95, at 696–97 (“Section 3 made it a crime to import a woman
into the United States for purposes of Prostitution.”).
112. Page Law § 1.
113. 3 CONG. REC. app. at 44 (1875) (statement of Rep. Horace F. Page).
114. Id.
115. Smearman, supra note 36, at 393–94.
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116

immigrant women in America. Accordingly, legislators passed the
117
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Exclusion Act), which effectively
enabled immigration officials to regulate undesirable marriages. The
law, which precluded all Chinese laborers from entering the United
States and reduced the categories of permissible Chinese immigrants
to merchants, ministers, sojourners, and students, made a wife’s
118
immigration status contingent on her husband’s occupation. As a
corollary, immigration officials were authorized to assess the validity
of a Chinese marriage so as to determine whether a Chinese woman
119
was truly the wife of a permissible immigrant. Six years later, the
120
Scott Act of 1888 (Scott Act) took the Exclusion Act’s implicit
regulation of marriage further by effectuating an expansive ban on
the practice of foreign polygamy. The Scott Act barred Chinese
121
laborers from reentering the United States after visiting China, a
prohibition that prevented Chinese men from making their customary
trips back to China to support the primary wives they had left
122
behind. The Scott Act thus prohibited Chinese immigrants from
123
maintaining “cross-continental” polygamous families.
Anti-Chinese legislation was, in many respects, an outgrowth of
the Mormon debate. Linked by the common rhetoric of slavery, the
discourse surrounding both Mormon and Chinese polygamy cast
these practices as aberrational forces in an otherwise-free society.
And in both instances, women were construed as the perpetuators of
social deviance. To insulate America from polygamy, legislators made
polygamous immigrants categorically inadmissible. Although
immigration law has long since lost its xenophobic overtones, gender
nonetheless remains a powerful subtext of the United States’ modern
polygamy bar.

116. Abrams, supra note 95, at 708.
117. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
118. Abrams, supra note 95, at 711; see also In re Ah Moy, 21 F. 785, 785 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884)
(holding that a Chinese immigrant’s wife was ineligible for entry because her status was
contingent on her husband’s occupation as a laborer).
119. Abrams, supra note 95, at 712; see also In re Lum Lin Ying, 59 F. 682, 682–84 (D. Or.
1894) (holding that an arranged marriage between a Chinese couple was valid in part because
the woman was not a prostitute).
120. Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943).
121. Id. § 1, 25 Stat. at 504.
122. Abrams, supra note 95, at 710.
123. Id.

EICHENBERGER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FOREIGN POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE

2/21/2012 4:30 PM

1083

D. Polygamy and Twentieth-Century Immigration Laws
U.S. immigration law has excluded practicing polygamists since
124
1891. Although scholars debate whether this ban was a result of
125
anti-Mormon or anti-Chinese sentiment, it does allow the federal
government to reshape marriages it finds inimical to American
values.
126
The Immigration Act of 1891 was the first federal immigration
law to categorically bar polygamy. The act grouped polygamists with
the other specimens of Victorian depravity: “idiots, insane
persons . . . [and] persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous
127
128
contagious disease.” The Immigration Act of 1907 (the 1907 Act)
followed shortly thereafter, and was passed amid fears that America’s
“temperate blood . . . [was] yearly experiencing a partial corruption of
129
foreign blood.” Although the 1907 Act left most excludable
categories the same, it broadened the polygamy bar to encompass
130
“persons who admit their belief in the practice of polygamy.” A
131
decade later, the Immigration Act of 1917 retained this broad
exclusionary language, forbidding the entry of “polygamists, or
persons who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice
132
of polygamy.” The subsequent Immigration and Nationality Act
133
(INA), as enacted in 1952, removed “belief” as a basis for exclusion
but continued to preclude “polygamists . . . who practice polygamy or
134
advocate the practice of polygamy.” The 1952 law’s polygamy bar
135
remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990 further

124. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
125. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 95, at 711 (arguing that American immigration policy was
formulated as a continuation of anti-Chinese sentiment). But see, e.g., COTT, supra note 37, at
139 (arguing that excluding polygamists was “a legacy of the campaign against Mormon
polygamy”).
126. Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1084.
127. Id. § 1, 26 Stat. at 1084.
128. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
129. COTT, supra note 37, at 140 (quoting then-scholar Woodrow Wilson).
130. Immigration Act of 1907 § 2, 34 Stat. at 898–99.
131. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
132. Id. § 3, 39 Stat. at 875–78.
133. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).
134. Id. § 212(a)(11), 66 Stat. at 182.
135. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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confined inadmissibility to immigrants “coming to the United States
136
to practice polygamy.”
137
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996 crystallized
America’s intolerance for polygamy by defining marriage as “only a
138
legal union between one man and one woman.” Unsurprisingly, the
current polygamy bar bears DOMA’s imprimatur. Under
§ 212(a)(10)(A) of the INA, “[a]ny immigrant who is coming to the
139
United States to practice polygamy is inadmissible.”
Section
212(a)(10)(A) precludes practicing polygamists from attaining any
category of legal-resident status, including a status obtained through
140
participation in the diversity lottery,
selection as a special
141
142
immigrant, or admission through employment programs. Section
212(a)(10)(A) further prohibits practicing polygamists from gaining
143
legal residency through adjustment-of-status proceedings.
Polygamous families that elude the polygamy bar risk immediate
144
145
deportation without the possibility of cancellation of removal.
136. Id. sec. 601(a), § 212(a)(9)(A), 104 Stat. at 5075.
137. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
138. Id. sec. 3(a), § 7, 110 Stat. at 2419 (emphasis added). Although DOMA is primarily
aimed at preventing homosexual marriage, scholars argue that it also precludes polygamy. See
Nicole Lawrence Ezer, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Family Law, 40 FAM. L.Q. 339,
345 (2006) (noting that “Congress intended the terms ‘spouse’ and ‘marriage’ to include only the
partners to a legal, monogamous marriage” (quoting Memorandum from William R. Yates,
Acting Assoc. Dir. of Operations, Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Reg’l & Serv. Ctr. Dirs. (Mar. 20, 2003))). A number of courts have declared Section
3 of DOMA unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[T]here is no valid governmental basis for DOMA. . . . [T]he court finds that DOMA violates
the equal protection rights of the Debtors as recognized under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010)
(holding that DOMA “violates core constitutional principles of equal protection”). Further,
President Obama announced that his administration would no longer defend DOMA. Charlie
Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1.
139. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A)
(2006).
140. INA § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c).
141. Id. § 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27).
142. Id. § 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1).
143. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. An adjustment of status allows admissible individuals to
apply for resident status from within the United States. Id.
144. Id. § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
145. See id. § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(B) (providing that the cancellation of
removal for inadmissible nonpermanent residents requires a finding of good moral character,
for which practicing polygamists are statutorily ineligible under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(f)).
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In addition to rendering marriage the “central organizing
146
principle” of American immigration policy, the foregoing laws
sanction intolerance of marriages that fall outside a narrow
conception of acceptability. In essence, the polygamy bar enables
officials to force polygamous marriages into the ill-fitting dimensions
of the traditional nuclear family. Although the polygamy bar has
progressed from its openly xenophobic predecessors, gender remains
an inexorable subtext of the current regulations. As Part III discusses,
the bar’s differential impact on the wives of polygamous immigrants
resonates with the gendered underpinnings of the nineteenth-century
polygamy debate.
III. POLYGAMY UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
America’s polygamy bar has profound consequences for
immigrant women. Because inadmissibility is limited to immigrants
who intend to practice polygamy in the United States, a polygamous
husband is free to immigrate, but he may sponsor only one wife. As a
result, American immigration laws sanction and exacerbate a power
differential that allows a man to emigrate unilaterally with the wife
147
and children of his choosing.
A. Family-Based Immigration
Modern immigration law is premised on a policy of family
148
unification. Under the INA, foreigners who wish to immigrate are
accorded a preference status based on their familial relationship with
either U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. Family-sponsored
visas are divided into two categories: the first, immediate-relative
preference visas, allows an unlimited number of visas for the spouses,
149
parents, and children of U.S. citizens; the second, family preference
visas, allows a limited number of visas for the children and spouses of

146. Kerry Abrams, Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1633 (2007).
147. See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 192.
148. See Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope
of Family, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 815 (2007) (“The INA is full of expressions of
legislative concern for the protection and reunification of families.”). One historical
underpinning of immigration legislation has been “the problem of keeping families of United
States Citizens and immigrants united.” Fiallo v. Bell, 436 U.S. 757, 795 n.6 (1977) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 85-1119, at 6 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016, 2020); accord Lau v. Kiley,
563 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that family reunification is “the foremost policy
underlying the granting of preference visas under our immigration laws”).
149. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
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150

legal permanent residents. The alien beneficiary of any family-based
visa may petition for a spouse and any unmarried children to be
classified as derivative beneficiaries. This derivative status affords
petitioners the same preference status and priority filing date
151
accorded to principal aliens. Non-family-sponsored immigrants
must rely on either humanitarian visas—which include refugee,
asylum, and Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
152
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA) visas—or employment visas
for admission. As a consequence, members of a polygamous
household seeking to immigrate must either fit within the narrow
definition of spouse or qualify for humanitarian- or employmentbased ingress.
B. Inadmissibility’s Gendered Impact on Plural Wives
Existing immigration laws make every effort to recognize foreign
153
To ascertain the validity of a foreign marriage,
marriages.
immigration officials determine first whether the marriage is valid in
its place of celebration and second whether the union is consistent
154
with U.S. public policy. Because polygamous marriages violate
155
DOMA, they “cannot be recognized for immigration purposes even
156
if the marriage is legal in the place of marriage celebration.”

150. The preference categories are as follows: first preference, comprising unmarried
children of U.S. citizens over the age of twenty-one under INA § 203(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(1); second preference, comprising unmarried children of legal permanent residents
under INA § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2); third preference, comprising married children of
U.S. citizens under INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3); and fourth preference, comprising
siblings aged twenty-one or older of U.S. citizens under INA § 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 9 FAM 42.31(d) (2009).
152. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18,
21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 42, 47, and 49 U.S.C.).
153. See United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that immigration
law should recognize foreign marriages that were valid in the place where they were
celebrated).
154. Smearman, supra note 36, at 404–05.
155. See supra note 138.
156. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.1 note 1.1(d); see also, e.g.,
Adomako, A99 365 109, 2006 WL 3712508, at *1 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2006) (“[P]olygamous
marriage, which may or may not be valid in Ghana where performed . . . cannot be
recognized . . . for immigration purposes . . . because the marriage is repugnant to United States
public policy.”); Mujahid, 15 I. & N. Dec. 546, 547 (B.I.A. 1976) (denying an Egyptian citizen’s
petition on behalf of his wife because the marriage had taken place when he was still married to
his first wife).
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These existing immigration laws, however, do not exclude
individuals merely because they have been in plural marriages.
Instead, the INA articulates a more nuanced bar: it only prohibits
immigrants who plan to continue practicing polygamy in the United
157
States. As a consequence, a polygamous husband can immigrate, but
158
he can sponsor only one of his wives. Because a husband’s first
marriage is presumptively valid, a petition on behalf of his first wife
will be approved regardless of whether he divorces his subsequent
159
wives. If, however, the husband wishes to sponsor one of his
160
subsequent wives, he must terminate all of his prior marriages
161
before entering the United States. Although subsequent wives in a
162
polygamous marriage may temporarily visit the United States, they
are statutorily ineligible to immigrate with their families. As the
following Sections discuss, this reality has the most profound effects
on women who seek to immigrate under special immigrant visas as
refugees, as asylees, or as battered women.

157. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 2.
158. Smearman, supra note 36, at 407; see also Nora Demleitner, How Much Do Western
Democracies Value Family and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 273, 279 (“Western countries generally deny recognition to polygamous marriages,
which means only the first wife can benefit from spousal unification.”).
159. See SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
FAMILY § 4:18 (2008) (“[Officials] will recognize the polygamist’s first marriage without
question; he need not end his subsequent marriages for his first spouse to obtain immigration
benefits.”); see also Nwangwu, 16 I. & N. Dec. 61, 62 (B.I.A. 1976) (“Any pre-existing valid
marriage is a bar to our recognition of the [subsequent] marriage on which the visa petition is
based.”).
160. ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER & SHANE DIZON, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 7:8 (2d
ed. 2008) (“[B]efore [the husband’s] third-in-time wife may immigrate based on their marriage,
the man must divorce the two wives that he married before her but need not divorce the fourth
wife.”). Whether a divorce is validly obtained hinges on the laws of the parties’ domicile. See,
e.g., Weaver, 16 I. & N. Dec. 730, 730 (B.I.A. 1979) (holding that a divorce is valid in the United
States if it was valid in the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the divorce).
161. GALLAGHER & DIZON, supra note 160, § 7:9.
162. Nonimmigrant visas are temporary visas for foreign nationals who do not intend to
relocate permanently to the United States, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006); id. § 101(a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(26), and they are
issued regardless of the applicant’s intent to practice polygamy, id. § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(3)(A); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 4 (2009). The
Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 151, however, cautions against the use of the nonimmigrant
visa as an illicit backdoor. See id. § 9 FAM 40.101 note 2 (2009) (“For example, an alien who
believes in the practice of polygamy and who has divorced all but one of his wives just prior to
visa application would arouse suspicion if it were known that the divorced spouse had recently
obtained a nonimmigrant visa.”).
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1. The Effect of the Polygamy Bar on Asylum Seekers and
Refugees. The ban on polygamous marriage “presents particular
163
problems for refugees and asylum seekers.” To qualify for asylum,
foreign nationals must demonstrate that they face a “well-founded
164
fear of persecution.” Asylum is awarded on a discretionary basis
165
after qualifying nationals have arrived in the United States. Because
immigration officials have statutory discretion to waive certain
166
admissibility requirements, including the ban on polygamy,
167
practicing polygamists are eligible for asylum. Polygamy will,
however, affect the principal aslyee’s ability to petition for asylum on
behalf of multiple spouses as derivative beneficiaries. A spouse can
obtain derivative asylum status only if he or she is validly married to
168
Because
the principal petitioner at the time of application.
polygamous marriages are categorically invalid for immigration
purposes, subsequent wives are ineligible for derivative-beneficiary
169
170
status and must therefore petition independently for asylum.
Practicing polygamists may also encounter problems under the
polygamy bar if they attempt to adjust their status from asylees to
171
permanent residents, as adjustments of status take inadmissibility
172
into account. Nonetheless, immigration officials do have discretion
to waive most grounds of inadmissibility—including polygamy—when
173
humanitarian considerations demand a more equitable approach.
The polygamy bar poses a greater problem for refugees.
Refugees are individuals facing persecution in their countries of
origin who, unlike asylees, petition for visas from outside the United
174
States. To obtain refugee status, immigrants must establish that they

163. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 279.
164. To qualify for asylum, immigrants must demonstrate that they fit within the INA’s
definition of “refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). As defined under INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), a refugee is “any person who is outside any country
of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution,” id.
165. Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2011).
166. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(v).
167. Smearman, supra note 36, at 436.
168. 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(b).
169. Smearman, supra note 36, at 437–38.
170. Hagerty, supra note 10.
171. Asylees have the option to adjust their status under 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1).
172. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006).
173. Id. § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c); 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(b).
174. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
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are otherwise eligible to immigrate under INA § 212(a). As is the
case with asylees, however, immigration officials have discretion to
waive the polygamy bar both initially—when refugees seek to
176
immigrate —and subsequently—when refugees file for adjustment
177
of status. Nonetheless, as is the case in the asylum process,
subsequent wives, who are statutorily ineligible to qualify as
178
spouses, cannot be accorded derivative-beneficiary status and must
179
apply as refugees independently from their husbands. Therefore,
subsequent wives in polygamous marriages will not receive refugee
visas concurrently with their families. Because refugees petition from
outside the United States, this delay may force a husband’s multiple
wives to be subjected to the atrocities their families are attempting to
flee. The United States’ approach has been met with chagrin from the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an agency that
“recognizes polygamous marriages in its criteria of eligible
unions . . . and prefers to refer such cases to resettlement
countries . . . that would allow the resettlement of the whole
180
family.”
Realizing that a rigid antipolygamy policy is inimical to both
family reunification and humanitarianism, the United States has
occasionally waived the polygamy bar. During the first Gulf War, for
example, the United States tacitly overlooked its antipolygamy laws
when it admitted polygamous Iraqi families who had aided in the
181
United States’ war efforts. This kind of exception, however, is a
rarity, and “[f]amily unification outside the refugee context always
182
excludes polygamous spouses.”

175. 8 C.F.R. § 207.3.
176. INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3).
177. Id. § 209(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(3). Unlike asylees, refugees must apply for an
adjustment of status within one year of immigrating to the United States. Id. § 209(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1).
178. See supra Part IV.B.
179. See INA § 207(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2)(A) (“A spouse . . . of any refugee who
qualifies for admission . . . shall . . . be entitled to the same admission status as such refugee if
accompanying, or following to join, such refugee and if the spouse . . . is admissible (except as
otherwise provided under paragraph (3)).”).
180. U.N. Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, Switz., June 20–21,
2001, Background Note: Protecting the Family: Challenges in Implementing Policy in the
Resettlement Context 6, http://www.unhcr.org/3b30baa04.html.
181. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 279.
182. Id.
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2. The Polygamy Bar’s Effect on Women Self-Petitioning for a
VAWA Visa. Foreign plural wives also face difficulties if they
attempt to immigrate through a VAWA visa. VAWA permits
immigrant women who have been abused by their U.S.-citizen or
legal-permanent-resident husbands to self-petition for permanent183
resident status. To qualify, an immigrant woman must prove that
184
she entered into a bona fide marriage with her spouse, that she or
185
her child was “battered” or subjected to “extreme cruelty,” and that
she was a person of “good moral character” in the three years
186
preceding her petition. VAWA, however, is inapplicable to women
in polygamous marriages on three independent grounds. First,
although VAWA exonerates women who believed that their
bigamous marriages were in fact monogamous at the time they
entered into their unions, it makes no exception for women who
187
knowingly entered into polygamous marriages. Second, according to
both DOMA and the INA, subsequent wives have not entered into
188
“bona fide marriage[s]” within the meaning of VAWA. Third, and
189
finally, women in polygamous marriages are “statutorily ineligible”
190
for the requisite finding of “good moral character.” VAWA thus

183. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005
§ 811, 119 Stat. at 3057.
184. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
185. Id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii).
186. Id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb).
187. See id. § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(BB), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(BB)
(exempting petitioners whose marriages are invalid “solely because of the bigamy of the
[abusive spouse]”). The Foreign Affairs Manual distinguishes bigamy, “a criminal act resulting
from having more than one spouse at a time without benefit of a prior divorce[,]” from
polygamy, “the historical custom or religious practice of having more than one wife or husband
at the same time.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.101 note 1. Whereas
parties to a polygamous marriage intentionally enter into a plural union, bigamy often occurs
when one spouse fails to obtain a valid divorce from a prior marriage. See id. (“Bigamy may
imply wrongdoing on the part of one of the spouses in failing to inform the other spouse . . . of
an existing marriage. . . . [Bigamy] may render an alien ineligible for an immigrant visa . . . if the
alien purposely married more than one wife or husband at the same time based on historical
custom or religious practice.” (emphasis added and omitted)).
188. INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)–(B).
189. Smearman, supra note 36, at 423.
190. See INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (“No person shall be regarded as . . . a
person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is
required to be established is, or was[,] . . . a member of one or more classes of
persons . . . described in paragraphs (2)(D), (6)(E), and (10)(A) . . . .”). According to Professor
Claire Smearman, although INA § 204(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(C), “provides that a self-
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creates insurmountable hurdles for battered wives in polygamous
191
marriages who self-petition for resident status.
C. Immigration and Children of Polygamous Households
Whereas additional wives in polygamous marriages are
statutorily ineligible for both legal-permanent-resident status and
special-visa status, the child of a polygamous marriage can immigrate
to the United States on four independent grounds: as a child born in
wedlock, as a stepchild, as a legitimate child, or as a child born out of
wedlock. This framework effectively bifurcates foreign polygamous
families by enabling a husband, a wife of his choosing, and all of his
children to immigrate to the United States, leaving the additional
192
wives behind.
Children of polygamous unions are eligible for entry as “children
193
194
born in wedlock” if they are the products of a valid marriage.
Because immigration law recognizes only a polygamous husband’s
marriage with his first-in-time wife, children will only qualify for this
195
category if they are products of that marriage. Children of
additional wives must therefore obtain entry under one of the three
remaining visa categories.
Unlike the “children born in wedlock” designation, the
196
“stepchild” visa “benefits members of a polygamous family in
197
unexpected ways.” Under INA § 101(b)(1)(B), the children of a
polygamous union may qualify as stepchildren of their father’s
petitioner who would be barred from a finding of good moral character as a result of an act or
conviction encompassed in the . . . statutory bars will not be precluded from a finding of good
moral character if she establishes that the act or conviction was connected to the abuse she
suffered,” this exception is inapplicable to foreign plural wives. Smearman, supra note 36, at
423–24.
191. Battered and abused women in polygamous marriages may, however, self-petition for
legal-permanent-resident status under a U visa, which allows noncitizens who have suffered
“substantial physical or mental abuse” as a result of criminal activity to self-petition for
nonimmigrant status if they have aided or are likely to aid in a governmental investigation of the
perpetrator. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). Unlike a VAWA visa, a U
visa does not require a finding of good moral character, id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i), and gives the secretary of homeland security substantial discretion to waive
inadmissibility, see id. § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).
192. See supra Part III.A–B.
193. INA § 101(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A).
194. See id.
195. Smearman, supra note 36, at 410.
196. INA § 101(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B).
197. Smearman, supra note 36, at 413.
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immigrated wife as long as the marriage between the stepparent and
the natural parent—in this instance, the marriage between the
children’s natural father and his immigrated wife—is valid for
immigration purposes and as long as the marriage occurred while the
198
children were minors. The stepchild designation thus allows the
immigrated wife in a polygamous marriage to petition on behalf of all
199
of her husband’s children, including those from his additional wives.
If the immigrated wife does not wish to sponsor the children
from her husband’s other marriages, her husband may nonetheless
sponsor all of his children as “legitimated children” or as “children
born out of wedlock.” A child qualifies as a legitimated child if he or
she resides in the custody of the legitimating parent and the
legitimation occurred in accordance with the laws of the child’s
200
201
domicile before he or she reached the age of majority. As the
202
Board of Immigration Appeals held in Kubicka, formal legitimation
203
can overcome a child’s polygamous parentage. Moreover, formal
legitimation is unnecessary if a child comes from a jurisdiction that
recognizes polygamy because children born to solemnized
204
polygamous unions are treated as legitimated from birth.
Alternatively, a polygamous father can petition for his children as

198. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 151, § 9 FAM 40.1 note 2.2; see also Awwal, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 617, 621 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that relationships between a stepchild and a stepparent
must be premised on a valid marriage between the child’s natural parent and the stepparent).
As long as the qualifying marriage is intact at the time of entry, the stepparent need not show a
demonstrable emotional connection with the child. Vizcaino, 19 I. & N. Dec. 644, 648 (B.I.A.
1988).
199. See Fong, 17 I. & N. Dec. 212, 21213 (B.I.A. 1980) (allowing a naturalized citizen born
to his father’s second wife to petition on behalf of his father’s first wife because the petitioner
claimed “a relationship to his father’s [valid] ‘first’ wife”). The relationship between the
stepchild and the stepparent, however, cannot be used to confer immigration privileges upon
illicit polygamous marriages. See Man, 16 I. & N. Dec. 543, 544 (B.I.A. 1978) (“It has never been
held . . . that the secondary wife can derive or bestow immigration benefits through children
born to the husband and his principal wife.”).
200. The requirements of legitimation are jurisdiction-specific and can occur in a variety of
ways, including through operation of law, judicial decree, marriage, and acknowledgment.
IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 159, §§ 6:22:25.
201. INA § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(ii) (2011).
202. Kubicka, 14 I. & N. Dec. 303 (B.I.A. 1972).
203. See id. at 304 (“It has never been held . . . that the secondary wife can derive or bestow
immigration benefits through children born to the husband and his principal wife.”).
204. See Smearman, supra note 36, at 413 (“In a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal and the
child is recognized as legitimate, the father of a child born to a second or subsequent wife who
has acknowledged and supported the child as his own will easily establish that the child is
‘legitimated’ under [the INA].”).
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“children born out of wedlock” as long as the children have “bona
205
fide parent-child relationship[s]” with their natural fathers. Because
evidence of a father’s bona fide relationship has been interpreted to
include “an active concern for the child’s support, instruction, and
206
general welfare,” in a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal and in a
case in which a father has publicly acknowledged the children of his
plural wives, the children should qualify as “children out of wedlock”
207
from birth.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, whereas a polygamous
man’s additional wives face tremendous barriers to entry, the children
of polygamous unions can immigrate without their biological mothers
under a variety of legal theories. The United States’ immigration bar
thus treats the offspring of polygamous relationships as innocent
bystanders to illicit unions, singling out polygamous consorts for their
participation in plural marriage.
D. Inadmissibility’s Gendered Impact
Since the nineteenth century, polygamists have been cast in an
immoral light. As evidenced by the statutory definition of “good
moral character,” which groups practicing polygamists with
208
prostitutes and Nazis, this negative perception endures. This legacy
is most keenly expressed in the United States’ polygamy bar, which
creates disproportionate hardships for women in polygamous
marriages. Whereas a polygamous husband can freely immigrate with
the wife of his choosing, women in polygamous marriages can only
immigrate at their husbands’ whims. As a result, polygamous
husbands have the power to decide where each of their wives
209
resides. In the case of refugees, those decisions may condemn the
wives left behind to suffer the very atrocities that their families have
210
fled. Polygamy also precludes battered women from self-petitioning
211
for status as legal permanent residents under VAWA. Further,
because children can immigrate regardless of their parents’ marital
205. INA § 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D).
206. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii).
207. See Smearman, supra note 36, at 413 (noting that a father can “easily establish” a bona
fide parent-child relationship if he raises and supports a child born to a second wife, the child
was born in a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal, and the child is recognized as legitimate).
208. INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).
209. Smearman, supra note 36, at 442.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See supra Part III.B.
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status, a husband can unilaterally divest his wives of child custody.
Although children can petition on behalf of the mothers they leave
behind, they cannot do so until they are naturalized citizens and are
at least twenty-one years of age.
Moreover, plural wives who enter the United States by
213
circumventing the immigration bar remain “invisible” under the
214
American legal system. Because their marriages are not recognized
215
under any state law, these wives are not entitled to the benefits of
216
217
either divorce or spousal support. It is also unlikely that the wives
of polygamous immigrants will be entitled to any succession rights if
218
their husbands die intestate. Finally, if a polygamous husband
chooses to abandon his multiple wives after immigrating, the women
219
have no legal recourse against their polygamous spouses and will
220
often face grave financial insecurity as a result. In essence,
immigrant women in polygamous unions are specters of a legal
system that once fought for their emancipation. Instead of deterring
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. Hagerty, supra note 10 (quoting Julie Dinnerstein, senior attorney with Sanctuary for
Families) (internal quotation mark omitted).
214. See supra Part III.
215. Polygamous marriages are illegal in all fifty states. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4
(“Bigamy and polygamy are forever prohibited in the state . . . .”); N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1
(“Polygamous or plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation are forever prohibited.”);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-201(1) (2011) (“Any married person who, while still married, marries
or cohabits in this state with another commits bigamy . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1)
(LexisNexis 2008) (“A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or
knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person
or cohabits with another person.”).
216. See MARGARET C. JASPER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 22–23 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining
that intentionally bigamous marriages cannot be “ratified, or validated” and that therefore the
parties to these marriages are also not entitled to divorce).
217. See Bernstein, supra note 2 (noting that there is “little case law to guide decisions on
marital property or benefits” in polygamous families).
218. Although no domestic court has squarely addressed the issue of succession rights for
immigrant plural wives residing in the United States, at least two cases have implied that these
women would not be entitled to succession rights. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188
P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (stating that although the decedent’s two wives domiciled in
India were entitled to an equal division of their husband’s estate, they would not have obtained
relief “if [the] decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California”); In re Estate
of Diba, No. 642-A/97, 2010 WL 2696611, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 8, 2010) (holding that the
proceeds of the decedent husband’s wrongful-death suit, which had been commenced against a
New York domiciliary, could lawfully be distributed to the decedent’s two spouses in Senegal
who “always were, and remain, citizens and domiciliaries of Senegal”).
219. Bernstein, supra note 2.
220. See id. (describing an immigrant from the Ivory Coast who left her polygamous
husband and who, “[w]ithout [immigration] papers, . . . ended up in a homeless shelter”).
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plural marriages, this approach forces practicing polygamists
underground, perpetuating the cycle of “abuse and exploitation” that
221
is sometimes synonymous with modern-day polygamy and depriving
222
women of the benefits that marriage confers.
IV. THE WESTERN WORLD’S CONFLICTED SOLUTIONS
The United States’ categorical polygamy bar differs from the
immigration laws of its peer nations, which have taken more
tempered approaches toward women in foreign polygamous unions.
Although Canada and the United Kingdom share the United States’
223
strong public policy against polygamy, both nations have opted for a
greater degree of equity than has the United States. Because Canada
and the United Kingdom have facilitated humanitarian-based ingress
for immigrant women in polygamous unions without endorsing plural
marriage, their respective approaches provide a compelling case for
change.
A. The United Kingdom’s Approach
The United Kingdom clarified its stance on polygamous
224
immigration when it passed the Immigration Act of 1988, which
articulated a firm policy of “prevent[ing] the formation of
225
polygamous households” by allowing a polygamous husband to
226
immigrate with only one of his wives. Yet despite adopting a
seemingly rigid stance against polygamy, the United Kingdom has
221. See DOROTHY ALLRED SOLOMON, PREDATOR, PREY AND OTHER KINFOLK:
GROWING UP IN POLYGAMY 13 (2003) (“The secrecy imposed by an illegal lifestyle further
undermines individual development, increasing the likelihood of abuse and exploitation.”).
222. Martha Bailey, Beverley Baines, Bita Amani & Amy Kaufman, Expanding Recognition
of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy Implications for Canada, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA,
supra note 19, report 3, at 1, 33.
223. See, e.g., Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 355 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (“[Polygamous] unions
are not considered as marriages, though they be called by that name, since such marriages are
not in conformity with our Christian concept of marriage.”); U.K. BORDER AGENCY,
IMMIGRATION DIRECTORATES’ INSTRUCTIONS ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1 (2009), available at http://
www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/idischapter8/section1/
annexc.pdf?view=Binary (“It is Government policy to prevent the formation of polygamous
households in this country.”).
224. Immigration Act, 1988, c. 14 (U.K.).
225. U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1.
226. Immigration Act, 1988, § 2. Unlike the law of the United States, which predicates entry
on the order of marriage, British law is indifferent to chronology, relying instead on “the order
in which polygamous wives come to the United Kingdom for settlement.” U.K. BORDER
AGENCY, supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 1.
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administered its immigration bar with an eye toward equality. First, if
a polygamous wife is denied entry, her children will also be denied
227
This measure
admittance, absent extenuating circumstances.
prevents husbands from unilaterally bifurcating their families and
instead encourages polygamous men to keep their families intact by
remaining in their foreign domiciles. Second, Britain’s immigration
laws feature one loophole that the United States’ laws do not: they
allow a man who divorces his first wife under English law to sponsor
his subsequent wives “while continuing to live with [the first wife] as
228
his spouse under Islamic law.” Third and finally, the law in the
United Kingdom that prohibits women from immigrating as multiple
spouses to a single husband “do[es] not apply to wives who have a
right of entry to the United Kingdom” under employment visas,
229
regardless of whether they intend to practice polygamy. For women
who immigrate separately from their polygamous husbands, “English
law has long regarded parties who were validly, albeit polygamously,
married elsewhere as being legal spouses in England for the purposes
230
of remarriage.” Thus, U.K. law entitles immigrant women to
231
232
spousal support, succession rights, and state benefits. Although
“[t]he law is drafted thus because the Government have no desire
forcibly to sever relationships that have been lawfully contracted in
other jurisdictions,” the English government has reiterated that this
approach “should not . . . be construed as government approval of
233
polygamous marriages.”
227. See U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, § 6.2 (“It will rarely be appropriate to
grant [children of a polygamous marriage] entry clearance where their natural mother is still
alive and still in a position to take care of them. . . . [This] would not apply to a child who has
the right of abode . . . .”).
228. Jonathan Wynne-Jones, Multiple Wives Will Mean Multiple Benefits, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 3, 2008, at 2.
229. U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note 223, § 7.
230. Joost Blom, Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time, 50
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 373, 382–83 (2003) (“Protecting the interests of family members is a value
shared by English and by the foreign law and outweighs whatever anomaly is produced in the
domestic legal system by recognizing a polygamous union as a marriage.”).
231. Id.
232. See Sue Reid, Polygamy UK: This Special Mail Investigation Reveals how Thousands of
Men Are Milking the Benefits System To Support Several Wives, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2009,
10:03 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1154789/Polygamy-UK-This-special-Mailinvestigation-reveals-thousands-men-milking-benefits-support-wives.html (“[A] man can
receive &£92.80 [sic] a week in income support for wife number one, and a further £33.65p [sic]
for each of his subsequent spouses.”).
233. CATHERINE FAIRBAIRN, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SN/HA/5051, POLYGAMY 5
(2011), available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN
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B. Canada’s Approach
Like the United Kingdom’s antipolygamy regulations, Canada’s
immigration laws provide an illuminating counterpoint to the United
234
States’ policies. Canadian immigration officials use a two-pronged
test to determine whether a foreign marriage is valid: first, the
marriage must be formally valid—meaning that it was originally valid
in the place of celebration—and second, it must be essentially valid—
235
meaning that each party had the capacity to marry. Because
polygamous marriages celebrated in countries that condone the
practice would qualify under this test, Canada might theoretically
236
recognize such marriages.
In practice, however, polygamous
237
families are presumptively inadmissible because they would violate
238
Canada’s criminal bigamy laws.
Nevertheless, Canada’s polygamy bar is not inflexible. Under the
239
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which was passed in 2001,
the minister of immigration can waive an immigrant’s inadmissibility
to accommodate “humanitarian and compassionate” considerations,
05051.pdf (quoting Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the
Ministry of Justice). Indeed, the United Kingdom continues to prohibit British residents from
entering into polygamous marriages either at home or abroad. Id. at 4.
234. Canada provides persuasive authority because it employs a system of cooperative
federalism that mirrors the United States’ own federal design. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 &
31 Vict., c. 3, § 94 (U.K.) (“[T]he Parliament of Canada may make Provision for the Uniformity
of all or any of the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick . . . but any Act of the Parliament of Canada making provision for such Uniformity
shall not have effect in any Province unless and until it is adopted and enacted as Law by the
Legislature thereof.”).
235. Amy J. Kaufman, Polygamous Marriages in Canada, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 315, 320
(2005).
236. See Tse v. Canada, [1983] 2 F.C. 308, 311 (Can. Fed. Ct.) (holding that, on the issue of
whether a polygamous marriage celebrated abroad was valid for immigration purposes, “the
answer . . . appears to be yes”).
237. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, § 125(1)(c)(i)
(Can.) (explaining that an immigrant is not considered a spouse for immigration purposes if
“the sponsor or the spouse was, at the time of their marriage, the spouse of another person”).
238. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 293 (Can.) (“(1) Every one who (a) practises
or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of
polygamy . . . is guilty of an indictable offence . . . .”). Accordingly, in Ali v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), (1998), 154 F.T.R. 285 (Can. Fed. Ct.), the court denied a Kuwaiti
man’s application on behalf of his two wives despite their protestations that they did not plan to
cohabitate in Canada, id. at 288. In November 2011, British Columbia’s intermediate court
affirmed the constitutionality of Canada’s polygamy ban. Ian Austen, Canadian Court Rules that
Polygamy Ban Is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/
24/world/americas/british-columbia-court-upholds-canadas-polygamy-ban.html.
239. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27 (Can.).

EICHENBERGER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1098

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2012 4:30 PM

[Vol. 61:1067

including “the best interests of a child directly affected” by a parent’s
240
Relying on the humanitarian waiver, Ottawa
inadmissibility.
officials granted permanent-resident status to polygamist Winston
Blackmore’s three wives in 1994 so that they could rejoin their
241
children in Canada. Officials took pains to mitigate any unseemly
precedent created by their decision, classifying the women as
“independent applicants under the humanitarian and compassionate
program,” rather than as members of an illicit “conjugal
242
relationship.” In addition to adjusting immigration policy with an
eye toward equity, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act also
243
permits polygamous families to enter simultaneously as refugees.
Finally, the act enables the minister of immigration to waive the
polygamy bar so that “some or all of the parties to a polygamous
marriage might enter Canada as independent immigrants under the
244
Investor or Skilled Worker classes.” Thus, rather than arming its
immigration officials with rigid exclusionary formulas, Canada allows
its officers to advance the equitable principles underlying family
unification.
The rights of polygamous couples are administered both by
245
Canada’s federal government, which controls marriage and divorce,
and by the individual provinces, which oversee marriage
246
247
solemnization.
Under Canada’s Divorce Act,
which defines
248
“spouse” as “either of two persons who are married to each other,”
polygamous spouses are categorically ineligible to divorce. This
249
decree codifies the precedent set by Hyde v. Hyde, an English case
in which the court reasoned that “if the compact of a polygamous
union does not carry with it those duties which it is the office of the
marriage law in this country to assert and enforce, such unions are not
250
within the reach of that law.” Consequently, the parties to the

240. Id. § 25(1).
241. Robert Matas, Immigration Bureaucrats Let Man’s Three Wives Stay, TORONTO
GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 7, 2002, at A1.
242. Id. (quoting Angela Battiston, Immigration Department spokeswoman).
243. Id.
244. Bala et al., supra note 19, at 34–35.
245. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91(26) (U.K.).
246. Id. § 92(12).
247. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2d Supp.) (Can.).
248. Id. § 2(1) (emphasis added).
249. Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 (Eng.).
250. Id. at 137.
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polygamous marriage were in that case “not entitled to the remedies,
251
the adjudication, or the relief of . . . matrimonial law.”
Over time, Hyde’s seemingly inflexible precedent has given way
to a more equitable approach aimed at reducing the tensions between
public policy and women’s rights. Under Canadian law, polygamous
252
immigrants may be entitled to spousal support. In Lim v. Lim —a
seminal case for the wives of polygamous immigrants—the second
wife of a Chinese national, who was domiciled with her husband in
Canada, petitioned for alimony. Although pursuant to Hyde, the
court declined to award spousal support, the judge nonetheless
opined in oft-quoted dicta,
It does not seem . . . consistent with common sense that this
plaintiff who was admitted into this country under our immigration
laws as the wife of the defendant and who, in China prior to her
coming to this country, enjoyed the full civil status of wife, should be
denied that status under our law, when, after a residence here of
almost 30 years with the defendant as her husband . . . she seeks
against her husband the remedy which our law provides to a wife to
claim alimony. . . . The implications arising from [the] refusal to
recognize the plaintiff’s status for the purpose in question
253
are . . . repellant to one’s sense of justice.

In the decades following Lim, Canadian courts have shown a
willingness to afford polygamously married immigrant women the
254
benefits of divorce. In In re Hassan, a subsequent Ontario case
255
concerning a woman in a potentially polygamous marriage, the
court held that the woman was a wife under the relevant Ontario
256
statute and was therefore entitled to spousal support.
Canadian federal law also recognizes succession rights of
polygamous spouses domiciled in Canada. In the seriatim opinions

251. Id. at 138; see also Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 355 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (explaining
that a polygamous marriage “will not be recognized as a valid marriage for the purpose of
enabling either party to take proceedings against the other to enforce . . . obligations incident to
a valid marriage contract”).
252. Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353 (Can. B.C. S.C.).
253. Id. at 357–58.
254. In re Hassan, (1976), 69 D.L.R. 3d 224 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
255. “Potentially polygamous marriages” are marriages that “are actually (de facto)
monogamous but are celebrated under a law which permits polygamy.” U.K. BORDER AGENCY,
supra note 223, ch. 8, § 1, annex C, § 5.
256. In re Hassan, 69 D.L.R. 3d at 231.
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257

announced in Yew v. British Columbia, Justice Archer Martin
supported the majority’s decision to confer succession rights on a
man’s multiple spouses, remarking on the “unsound” consequences of
258
allowing just one wife to recover from her husband’s estate.
Warning that such a policy “would lead to unthinkable confusion of
principles and imperilment of the status and rights” of the women
259
involved, Justice Martin concluded that the law should recognize a
polygamous husband’s several marriages for the purposes of
260
determining succession.
In addition to the protections available to the foreign wives of
polygamous immigrants under Canadian federal law, several
Canadian provinces have enacted definitions of marriage that
recognize the rights of plural wives. In Ontario, for example, a man or
woman is still considered a spouse even though the marriage is
“actually . . . polygamous, if [the marriage] was celebrated in a
261
jurisdiction whose system of law recognizes [the marriage] as valid.”
Spouses of foreign polygamous unions are entitled to a bevy of legal
rights under Ontario law, including spousal and child support,
262
separation agreements, and standing in wrongful-death suits.
Polygamous spouses can also “pursue claims for an equalization of
263
net family property between the spouses on separation or death.”
Indeed, “under the law of Ontario, a spouse who contracted a valid
polygamous marriage abroad has the same legal rights and
obligations as a spouse who is party to a traditional monogamous
264
marriage.”
Canada’s case law and provincial regulations demonstrate a
commitment to fairness rather than strict exclusion. Recognizing the
profound injustice that results when women are forcibly estranged
from their families, Canada has established a system of discretionary
workarounds and rhetorical distinctions to mitigate the kinds of

257. Yew v. B.C. (Att’y Gen.), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1166 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
258. Id. at 1180.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1185 (holding that “the two domiciled Chinese wives of the deceased should be
regarded . . . as his lawful wives for the purposes of the statute under consideration”); accord
Lim v. Lim, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 353, 357 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (limiting the applicability of Yew’s holding
to succession rights).
261. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 1(2) (Can.).
262. JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN FAMILY LAW 28 (3d ed. 2008).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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harms that the United States’ policies impose on polygamously
married immigrant women. Furthermore, Canada has endowed the
wives in such unions with legal rights akin to those of monogamous
women to prevent legal invisibility. Thus, Canada maintains the de
jure endorsement of monogamy while establishing a de facto system
of equity.
V. A SOLUTION: EXPANDING THE HUMANITARIAN VISA AND
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE
To rectify the harms inflicted upon polygamously married
immigrant women, the United States should adopt a more equitable
stance, similar to the approaches taken in Canada and the United
Kingdom. This stance can be achieved through a two-pronged
approach. First, immigration officials should be given enhanced
discretion to waive the polygamy bar in a range of humanitarian
circumstances. Second, states should use the putative-spouse doctrine
to accord polygamously married émigrés the anticipated incidents of
their marriages. Rather than undermine the United States’
longstanding antipolygamy policy, this proposed approach would
strengthen the United States’ commitment to family reunification and
gender equality without endorsing plural marriage.
A. Expanding the Humanitarian Visa
1. Congress, Not the Judiciary, Must Intervene. Any change to
the United States’ polygamy bar must begin with Congress. Under
the plenary-power doctrine, “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners . . . is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit
265
and prevent their entrance into the country.” The Supreme Court
has long held that Congress has unfettered authority to regulate “the
266
admission of aliens” and, further, that any congressional articulation
267
of immigration policy is “conclusive upon the judiciary.”
Considering its unilateral and largely unchecked power to formulate
immigration policy, Congress should revise the existing polygamy bar
268
because, in addition to disadvantaging foreign women, the bar also

265.
266.
267.
268.

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
See supra Part III.
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contravenes Congress’s abiding interest in family reunification. To
accomplish this change, Congress should consider broadening
immigration law’s definition of family by replacing the traditional
nuclear ideal with a more flexible understanding. This would enable
officials to recognize polygamous unions for the limited purpose of
conferring residency, without undermining the strong public policy
against plural marriage.
The United States’ immigration laws reflect a preference for the
270
traditional nuclear family. This ideal, however, is no longer the
dominant reality, as “many households do not fit [the nuclear family]
271
mold.” Today, an estimated “[t]wenty-eight million children in the
United States grow up in families in which care is not provided
272
exclusively by two heterosexual parents.” In light of this trend, the
Supreme Court has eschewed a rigid definition of family, opining that
“[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
273
uniting the members of the nuclear [household].”
The Court has long conferred constitutional protections on “the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,” including
274
decisions regarding marriage and procreation. Courts have faced
the question of how far individuals’ intimate liberties should extend
and, furthermore, how the bounds of autonomy might alter the
traditional concept of family. In response to these burgeoning
275
questions of personhood, the Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, pushed
the bounds of intimate autonomy past established cultural norms.
Reasoning that “the right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct” is a right “that has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries,” the Court
concluded that homosexual intercourse is a liberty interest protected
276
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a
vehement dissent, Justice Scalia warned that the majority’s reasoning

269. See supra Part III.
270. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding the Morrill AntiBigamy Act’s prohibition of polygamy); supra Part III.A.
271. Demleitner, supra note 158, at 290.
272. Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a CareBased Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 91 (2004).
273. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
274. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
275. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
276. Id. at 577.
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eliminated any principled argument that a similar tolerance for
277
polygamous marriage is not constitutionally required.
278
Despite some scholars’ beliefs to the contrary, it is unlikely that
Congress will reverse its stance on the validity of polygamous
marriages under immigration law. Rather, for polygamous families to
obtain federal recognition, they will have to be recognized through
functional means. A limited number of state courts have chosen to
honor relationships that, although not familial in a legal sense, are
nonetheless characterized by the “emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence” underpinning the concept of
279
family. Indeed, in countries that condone its practice, polygamy
provides the complex emotional and fiscal attachments that are
280
central to this functional definition of family. As the following
Subsections discuss in greater detail, if Congress were to adopt a
functional understanding of family for the purposes of polygamous
immigration, it could adhere to its family-centric ethos without
legalizing polygamy.
2. Proposed Changes to the Humanitarian Visas. To mitigate the
immigration bar’s harmful effects on the wives of polygamous
immigrants, the United States should allow immigration officials to
exercise greater discretion when granting humanitarian visas to
277. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Since Lawrence, commentators have debated whether polygamy will be legalized. See
generally Joseph J. Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After
Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409, 413 (2004)
(concluding that although “polygamy statutes need not be overturned[,] . . . . Lawrence . . . may
very well have left all morals-based legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack”); Samantha
Slark, Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests
of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 458 (2004) (“In light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence, it is no longer legitimate to prohibit the practice of polygamy
merely because there is a long history of criminalization of the practice or because a majority of
society still deems it immoral.”).
279. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989) (eschewing a strict legal
definition of family because “a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence”). But see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Pine, 848 N.Y.S.2d 190, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (declining to extend the “expansive”
definition of family in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)).
280. See Angela Campbell, How Have Policy Approaches to Polygamy Responded to
Women’s Experiences and Rights? An International, Comparative Analysis, in POLYGAMY IN
CANADA, supra note 19, report 1, at 10 (“Many women living in polygamy have supported
plural marriage and appear to find happiness and satisfaction within their family structures.
Certain anecdotes reveal genuine love and companionship among polygamous spouses and
within their entire family unit.”).
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polygamous families. The proposed initiative should begin with a
revision of VAWA, which, as previously discussed, excludes women
in polygamous marriages from the category of battered spouses who
281
can obtain relief from their abusive marriages. Congress should first
remove polygamy from VAWA’s calculus of “good moral character”
when a foreign petitioner can prove that her polygamous marriage
was valid under the laws of the country where the marriage was
282
solemnized. Because, in their countries of origin, validly married
women have entered into legally and socially cognizable unions with
their polygamous husbands, categorically precluding them from
establishing good moral character is arbitrary and inhumane.
Furthermore, this de facto condemnation vitiates VAWA’s primary
purpose: empowering women to leave their toxic marriages. Revising
the requirements for good moral character would thus restore
VAWA’s humanitarian purpose without compromising public policy.
In addition to removing polygamy from VAWA’s calculus of
good moral character, lawmakers should enable polygamously
283
married women to reunite with their immigrant children. The
United States could mitigate the harmful effects of its policy on the
family by adopting the United Kingdom’s approach of refusing
284
admission to a woman’s children if she is denied entry. Such a
solution, however, would run afoul of the United States’ family285
centric immigration system because it would bifurcate child custody.
A better tactic would thus be to adopt Canada’s solution of allowing
286
subsequent wives to rejoin their children as independent petitioners.
Although this approach could be pursued by crafting a new
humanitarian visa, it could also be accomplished by allowing officials
to waive the polygamy bar for women petitioning under employment287
based visas.

281. See supra Part III.B.2.
282. Smearman, supra note 36, at 446.
283. See supra Part III.C.
284. Bala et al., supra note 19, at 24.
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See Matas, supra note 241 (noting that William Blackmore’s polygamous wives
obtained entry “as independent applicants under the humanitarian and compassionate
program”).
287. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. The benefit of this approach is that
qualifying applicants would theoretically be fiscally self-sufficient and therefore less likely to
claim public assistance.
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An interest in family reunification would also justify expanding
the definition of derivative beneficiaries to include refugees and
asylum seekers. Under existing laws, which preclude foreign women
from petitioning as spouses in connection with their polygamous
husbands’ refugee or asylum visas, inadmissible wives face potentially
288
fatal consequences. To remedy this harm, the United States should
follow Canada’s example by enabling polygamously married women
289
to petition as derivative beneficiaries of their children’s visas. This
approach would recognize the humanitarian tenor of women’s
resettlement without endorsing plural marriage. Alternatively, if
there are no children within the polygamous marriage, Congress
could craft a new subset of immediate-relative derivative visas
290
premised on a functional definition of family. Indeed, the current
policies, which allow immigration officials to disregard polygamy in
adjustment-of-status proceedings, support the notion that Congress
291
did not intend for polygamy to impede humanitarian resettlement.
Together, these changes to humanitarian visas would mitigate
the polygamy bar’s harmful effects on foreign women and would
bolster the United States’ commitment to family reunification.
B. Applying the Doctrine of Putative Spouses to Foreign Plural Wives
Once immigrants are inside the United States, their status is no
longer governed by the plenary-power doctrine. Immigrants’ rights at
that stage are instead administered by the tradition of Yick Wo v.
292
under which “aliens are ‘persons’ for purposes of
Hopkins,
293
[constitutional] protection.” Although the United States has thus far
294
the
eschewed a constitutional right to polygamous marriage,
Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized a liberty interest in the
“emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
288. See supra Part III.
289. See supra Part IV.
290. See supra Part V.A.1.
291. See supra Part III.
292. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
293. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1994) (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369). The Yick Wo tradition
has resulted in a variety of constitutional protections for aliens, including protections under the
Ninth, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments in criminal proceedings, as well as certain First
Amendment rights. Id. at 1060–61.
294. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 16566 (1879) (holding that the Morrill AntiBigamy Act’s prohibition on polygamy does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment).
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295

association.” This interest in protecting familial bonds has led many
states “to provide the rights of relationship to non-traditional family
members, even while [they continue to resist] the expansion of
296
traditional notions of family status.” Many state courts, finding an
affirmative duty to invest nontraditional families with legal rights,
have encouraged legislatures to adopt laws that protect, for example,
297
same-sex relationships.
The American Law Institute likewise
advocates giving parties whose relationships are not legally
cognizable the opportunity to receive the incidents of marriage,
including property division and compensatory payments upon
298
dissolution. Thus, given that legal immigrants are entitled to the
benefits and protections of U.S. law, and given that state legislatures
have trended toward recognizing nontraditional relationships, states
should use the putative-spouse doctrine to provide foreign plural
wives the incidents of marriage.
The putative-spouse doctrine is the best avenue for providing
immigrant women in polygamous marriages with the incidents of
299
their unions. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA)
defines a putative spouse as “[a]ny person who has cohabited with
another to whom he is not legally married in the good faith belief that
300
he was married to that person.” Although the doctrine of putative
spouses is typically used to compensate the innocent spouse in a
bigamous union, it could also apply to foreign women who possessed
the good-faith belief that their state-sanctioned polygamous
301
marriages were legal at the time they were contracted. Expanding
the doctrine to foreign polygamous marriage would entitle

295. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
296. Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The Growing,
Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend To Disaggregate Family Status from Family
Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 177 (2010).
297. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (extending the benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples).
298. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §§ 6.01–.06 (2000).
299. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (1974).
300. Id. § 209. The UMDA has not been accepted by all fifty states, but a number of states
recognize putative spouses. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2004) (recognizing a
putative marriage in which “either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage
was valid”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (West 2006) (“Any person who has cohabited with
another to whom the person is not legally married in the good faith belief that the person was
married to the other is a putative spouse until knowledge of the fact that the person is not
legally married terminates the status . . . .”).
301. See supra Part I.
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subsequent wives to a range of possible benefits, including alimony,
303
304
property division, succession rights, the ability to sue for a
305
decedent spouse’s wrongful death, and the right to receive public
306
retirement benefits through a surviving spouse. This approach
would have two advantages. First, it would give foreign women the
benefits of monogamy while nullifying an otherwise-repugnant union.
Second, because it would apply only to “good faith” marriages,
adapting the doctrine to foreign polygamous unions would not
exonerate U.S. domiciliaries from purposeful bigamy.
C. Welfare Challenges to this Proposed Solution
Although this two-pronged solution would vindicate the rights of
foreign women in polygamous marriages, the correlative increase in
eligible immigrants could burden the welfare system. Under INA
§ 212(a)(4), an immigrant who “is likely at any time to become a
public charge” is ineligible for either admission or adjustment of
307
status. The public-charge bar, however, is inapplicable to refugees
308
309
and asylees seeking either admission or adjustment of status. As a
consequence, admitting polygamously married women as derivative
beneficiaries to a principal’s refugee or asylum petition would create
the greatest probability of fiscal strain. Refugees and asylum seekers
310
are entitled to a bevy of government welfare benefits, including
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Social Security,

302. See Kindle v. Kindle, 629 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding
permanent alimony to the putative spouse).
303. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1976) (awarding a putative wife
approximately 8 percent of her husband’s property); Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129–30
(Nev. 2004) (upholding a property division between putative spouses).
304. See, e.g., Estate of Leslie, 689 P.2d 133, 140 (Cal. 1984) (“[A] surviving putative spouse
is entitled to succeed to a share of his or her decedent’s separate property.”).
305. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377.60(b) (West Supp. 2011) (establishing that a
putative spouse has standing to sue for a decedent spouse’s wrongful death).
306. Frank S. Berall, The Non-Traditional Family in the United States and Canada—Estate
and Tax Planning Responses, in FAMILIES AND ESTATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 9, 13
(Rosalind F. Croucher ed., 2005).
307. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A)
(2006).
308. INA § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C.§ 1157(c)(3).
309. Id. § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c).
310. Refugees have a “relatively high participation rate” in federal welfare programs
because they “are eligible for assistance upon arriving . . . and are encouraged by refugeeintegrating programs to seek it.” Paul Meehan, Combatting Restrictions on Immigrant Access to
Public Benefits: A Human Rights Perspective, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 389, 394 n.22 (1997).
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311

and Supplemental Social Security (SSI). Because Social Security
312
benefits accrue upon retirement and because SSI benefits are
313
specific to elderly and disabled workers, this Section focuses on
alleviating potential burdens on the TANF program.
As a general matter, because refugees “flee their homes with
little more than the clothes on their backs,” they are more likely than
314
any other class of immigrants to receive federal TANF assistance.
The TANF program is designed to “provide assistance to needy
315
families” while “promoting job preparation, work and marriage.”
Under the TANF program, states receive a block federal grant to
distribute to qualified families in the form of “cash, payments,
vouchers and other . . . benefits designed to meet a family’s ongoing
316
basic needs.” Although states can articulate their own guidelines for
TANF eligibility, the federal government restricts TANF assistance
to households in which adult family members “participate
317
in . . . allowable work activities for specified hours each week.” In
addition to the strict work requirement, families are limited to sixty
318
months of TANF assistance.
The TANF program has the potential to be abused if the wives
of polygamous immigrants living in polygamous households claim
TANF benefits as single parents. Such welfare fraud is rampant
among Mormon fundamentalist communities in which fundamentalist
men “spiritually marry” multiples wives so that “in the eyes of the

311. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A) (2006); Marcia Henry, Immigrants’ Eligibility for Federal
Benefits, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 393, 395–97 (2004).
312. 20 C.F.R. § 404.110 (2011). Numerous solutions have been proposed to prevent
excessive social-security payouts to polygamous wives. One approach would be to preclude
subsequent wives from receiving payments altogether. The 1968 U.K. Law Commission,
however, suggested that social-security benefits could be payable to each of a man’s polygamous
wives in full, provided that the husband made an increased tax contribution. Bailey et al., supra
note 222, at 13. Alternatively, it suggested that “social security benefits that would have been
payable to one wife should be equally divided between all of the wives of a polygamous
marriage.” Id. (quoting U.K. LAW COMM’N, PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER NO. 21,
POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES 50 (1968)).
313. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202.
314. Bill Ong Hing, Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories
and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 174 (1998).
315. 45 C.F.R. § 260.20(a)–(b) (2011).
316. 45 C.F.R. § 260.31(a)(1).
317. TANF Fact Sheet, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/
fact_sheets/tanf_factsheet.pdf (last updated Apr. 2009).
318. See 45 C.F.R. § 260.59 (imposing penalties for states that exceed the federal five-year
limit).

EICHENBERGER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FOREIGN POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE

2/21/2012 4:30 PM

1109

state, the subsequent wives all remain single mothers eligible for
319
welfare and other forms of public assistance.” To curtail this type of
abuse, the United Kingdom has implemented a system whereby
spouses in a polygamous union receive a prorated share of family
benefits. Under this revised program, “a man can receive £92.80 a
week in income support for wife number one, and a further £33.65p
320
[sic] for each of his subsequent spouses.” Because the United
Kingdom’s “benefit is payable at the difference between the couple
rate and the higher rate for a single person . . . there is no financial
321
advantage to claiming for those in a polygamous marriage.”
Although a prorated-benefits system would likely ease the fiscal
strain on welfare programs such as TANF, it is not without its
problems. Because such a payment structure implicitly recognizes and
endorses polygamous unions, the United Kingdom’s approach would
need to be tweaked slightly. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that
polygamous refugees or asylum seekers would immediately abandon
their polygamous lifestyles. Instead, there would probably be a period
in which polygamous families still resided together. TANF assistance
should account for this reality by providing foreign polygamous
families with prorated benefits for a limited period of time. In
keeping with TANF’s rigid accountability measures, a husband’s
multiple wives would have to demonstrate that they are both
physically independent and engaged in an eligible work program to
receive single-person TANF benefits at the end of the appointed time
frame. In addition to limiting the strain on federal welfare, this
approach would integrate polygamous immigrants into the national
economy.
Even if polygamous refugees and asylum seekers pose an initial
322
threat of fiscal strain,
scholarship suggests that “[o]verall,
323
immigrants represent a net fiscal plus.” In a 1994 study, researchers
estimated that “immigrants arriving after 1970 pay taxes of seventy
319. Alyssa Rower, The Legality of Polygamy: Using the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 38 FAM. L.Q. 711, 717 (2004). In Colorado City, Utah, which boasts a
significant Mormon fundamentalist population, “[33] percent of the town’s residents receive
food stamps, which is shockingly high compared to the state average of 4.7 percent.” Id.
320. Reid, supra note 232.
321. FAIRBAIRN, supra note 233, at 8.
322. Indeed, the federal government assumes that immigrants will create a fiscal deficit. See
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 402, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1612 (2006) (restricting immigrants’ access to public assistance).
323. Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix, United States Immigration in a Global Context: Past,
Present, and Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 14 (1994).
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billion dollars to all levels of government—a net surplus of twenty
324
five to thirty billion dollars more than they use in public services.”
Although evidence indicates that refugees are the largest immigrant
325
consumers of public assistance, “statistics for the second generation
of refugees specifically demonstrate that refugee welfare use is
326
transitional rather than permanent.” Because refugee assistance has
327
not been shown to create a “cycle of dependency,” polygamous
immigrants may ultimately produce net fiscal gains in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
The antipolygamy movement, which began as the clarion call of
women’s suffrage, has led, paradoxically, to the development of an
immigration system that curtails women’s rights. By mapping
American values onto marriages that were consented to without
DOMA in mind, the United States is endorsing a form of invidious
gender discrimination. To rectify this harm, the United States should
look to the examples of its peer nations, which, in recent years, have
embraced the principle of equality in dealing with polygamous
immigrants. To keep pace with its peer nations, the United States
should adopt the two-pronged approach of, first, expanding the
categories of permissible humanitarian immigrants and, second, using
the putative-spouse doctrine to vindicate plural wives’ expectations.
Together, these measures would reconcile the tensions inherent in the
United States’ protracted battled against polygamy by both
328
emancipating women from an “odious” marital institution and
ameliorating the law’s discriminatory effects.

324. Id. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
(1989) (arguing that immigrants create a net financial benefit). But see generally DONALD
HUDDLE, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, THE NET COSTS OF IMMIGRATION: THE FACTS,
THE TRENDS, AND THE CRITICS, at i (1996) (concluding that, during the 1990s, immigrants
yielded a $65.01 billion net deficit).
325. See Hing, supra note 314, at 173 (arguing that, outside of the refugee context, “use of
all public programs . . . by immigrants does not impose any unusual fiscal burden”).
326. Id. at 174.
327. Id.
328. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).

